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Abstract
Scandals of corporate governance in the United States and Europe in the
aftermathoftheTMTbubblecapturedthepublicimagination.Inplaywerethe
interestsofseniorexecutivesinrelationtoinvestors,promptingdebateover
countries’ standards of corporate governance in the global market place.
Ahold was (and is) an especially important instance, involving signiﬁcant
internal accounting and reporting failures and poor public disclosure of
market-sensitive information. Ahold is also a global corporation cross-
listed on major ﬁnancial markets. In this paper, we report the analysis of
markettradinginAholdstockbetweenAmsterdamandNewYork.Itisshown
thatgreatervolatilityinAmsterdamdailyclosingpricespresagedthecrisisto
come in Ahold shares implying leakage of information to privileged local
insiders.ItisalsoshownthatintheaftermathofAhold’scrisis,management
responded to the lack of global investor conﬁdence by improving transpar-
ency and governance standards consistent with the expectations of global
investors.Implicationsaredrawnforthepricingofcorporategovernanceand
the process of convergence in national standards of corporate governance.
The continuity of different regimes of governance is subject to inter-market
arbitrage especially if corporations seek to maintain and enhance their
reputations in the global ﬁnancial market place.
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1. Introduction
Over the 1990s, global capital market integration focused on firms and industries was
widely perceived as inevitable (see Litterman et al., 2003). In the aftermath of the TMT
* Oxford University Centre for the Environment, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QY, UK.
email: gordon.clark@ouce.ox.ac.uk
** Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
email: gordon.clark@ouce.ox.ac.uk
*** Jesus College, Turl Street, Oxford OX1 3DW, UK.
email: dariusz.wojcikpouce.ox.ac.uk
**** LIFE, Maastricht University, P.O.Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
email: r.bauer@abp.nl
# The Author (2005). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org(telecommunications, media and technology) bubble and scandals of corporate govern-
ance, the prospect of a ‘one-world’ market has receded (Stulz, 2005). The crisis of
confidence in national systems of corporate governance has raised doubts about the
integrity of the available market information on corporations’ circumstances and pro-
spects. One response has been to enhance national regulations; another response by
institutional investors has been to monitor more closely corporate decision-making
across jurisdictions (Clark and Hebb, 2005). At the time of negotiation over the design
of a global financial accounting reporting system, these scandals strengthened the hands
of those committed to independent global reporting system eschewing the compromises
evident in local standards and traditions. This paper is about the emerging global
market for price-sensitive information, driven in part by institutional investors vulner-
able to changes in the market prices of corporations cross-listed between financial
markets.
Royal Ahold is one of just a handful of global players in the food retailing and
wholesaling industry (see Wrigley, 2000; Coe, 2004; Wrigley et al., 2005). Over the
1990s, it accumulated enormous geographical scope, reporting in Amsterdam market
share and revenue from virtually all corners of the world (Wrigley and Currah, 2003).
However, as doubts surfaced about the integrity of market information regarding
Ahold’s prospects and the robustness of its internal controls in its far-flung empire
its market price became more volatile. In the end, this led to a crisis of corporate
governance and the resignation of its CEO, retrenchment in its global ambitions and
a significant loss of ‘reputational’ capital amongst institutional investors. To illustrate
Ahold’s standing amongst institutional investors, GovernanceMetrics International
(GMI) attributed it a 2004 overall low rating of 4.5 (against its industry peers) and a
low regional rating of 3.5 (against its European peers) (each against a possible score
of 10). The Ahold story, similar to related stories of crises of governance, has been told
in a variety of places; it is not our intention to go over well-trodden ground.
1 Rather,
our goal is to look more carefully at the stock market response to Ahold’s crisis of
corporate governance in the light of inter-market arbitrage and the response of Ahold
management to negative market sentiments. More generally, we draw implications for
global capital market integration and the prospects for global convergence in national
standards of corporate governance.
Information was collected on the Amsterdam daily Ahold stock market closing price
for the period 1973–2004 (over 10000 observations). We sought to characterize the
history of Ahold as seen through the Amsterdam stock market, paying particular atten-
tion to the existence of distinctive episodes as well as crucial inflection points marking-
off the beginning and end of different episodes in market trading and expectations.
Each episode was analysed in terms of its volatility and its underlying time-series prop-
erties. Having demonstrated significant discounting in Ahold stock before the official
announcement of accounting irregularities, the view from New York was analysed
utilizing Granger tests of causality. Before the crisis, New York trading in Ahold
1 There are many academic and industry studies of the corporate governance scandals at Enron, World-
Com, Parmalat, and to a lesser extent Ahold. See Broekstra et al. (2004), de Jong et al. (2005), and
Wrigley and Currah (2003) on Ahold, Coffee (2003) and Gordon (2003) on Enron, Melis (2003) on
Parmalat and Sidak (2003) on WorldCom. Most of these citations were taken from www.ssrn.com—there
there are other such commentaries available.
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traders relied exclusively on Amsterdam market information. It is also shown that
Ahold management responded by increasing the disclosure of market-sensitive informa-
tion so as to ‘manage’ distant market expectations. Here, we rely upon Deminor’s
proprietary database of European corporate governance ratings sensitive to the
interests of financial markets [explained in detail in Wo ´jcik et al. (2004)].
Ahold’s ‘problems’ are representative of a classic issue—the power of incumbent
managers when owners are unorganized and their holdings small and dispersed over
many institutions (see Roe, 1994). In the Ahold case, it assumes greater significance
because of the claimed distinctiveness of continental European traditions in the context
of a global market for price-sensitive information across jurisdictions. Over the 1990s,
ownership of Ahold was fragmented and spread over a number of markets through
cross-listing (including New York). Geographically dispersed ownership, partly the
result of domestic disengagement and portfolio globalization by large Dutch investors
and pension funds, provided managers room to manoeuvre. Problems of accountability
and management within Ahold were registered as ‘surprises’ on global stock markets
with precipitous changes in Ahold stock prices. Thereafter, Ahold sought to re-assure
institutional investors by significantly improving disclosure related to standards of
corporate governance.
The Ahold story is consistent with those that argue there is a relationship between
corporate governance and market value (Gompers et al., 2003; Bauer et al., 2004). We
link this issue to the debate about convergence of national standards of corporate
governance. In part, our argument is negative in the sense that the evidence suggests
that Ahold’s ‘problems’ were first registered in their home location notwithstanding
cross-listing between markets. In another sense, however, our argument is positive in
that the response of Ahold to investor sentiment was conceived to meet expectations of
higher standards in global capital markets. Ahold’s response is consistent with the
increasing willingness of institutional investors to intervene in large but poorly gov-
erned companies whatever their ‘home’ jurisdictions may be: corporate engagement
may be a vital ingredient in the transformation of company-specific standards of
governance in relation to global standards (as suggested by Clark and Hebb, 2005;
Hebb and Wo ´jcik, 2005).
2. The geography of finance
This paper falls between two vibrant research programmes, one in economic geography
on the structure and performance of global markets and the other in finance on the
relationship between nation–state systems of corporate governance and stock market
performance.
2 Of course, we do not mean to suggest that economic geography and
finance are the only disciplines focused upon these issues. Making the bridge between
these research programmes depends upon initial assumptions about the nature
and efficiency of global stock markets. If we assume that global capital markets are
2 See, respectively, Clark and Wo ´jcik (2003, 2005) on the regional foundations of the German model in
relation to global economic imperatives (a geographical perspective), and Halling et al. (2004) on the
cross-listing of firms on global financial markets and national systems of corporate governance (a finance
perspective).
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close attention to the institutional features of these markets and their relative perform-
ance would be irrelevant. While some analysts are convinced that the future of global
capital markets is one virtual market characterized by strong efficiency in time and
space, few analysts are convinced that this is an adequate characterization of contem-
porary circumstances (compare O’Brien, 1992).
The mapping by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) of the legal and institutional foundations
of nation–state financial markets has been widely accepted as an appropriate reference
point in understanding market-by-market differentiation and the prospects for integ-
ration. Recall La Porta et al. demonstrated that there are distinctive groups of financial
markets rather than just one kind of financial market or one kind of institutional
structure. They mapped the historical importance of different legal traditions with
respect to the rights and privileges of insiders vs. outsiders and worked ‘forward’ to
current market structure and performance. They also argued that market liquidity can
be explained by reference to these legal institutions and the degree of protection
afforded ‘outsiders’ investing in listed companies. Their mapping exercise was, in
part, an exercise in documenting the obvious just as it was an exercise in explaining
the relative performance of one kind of financial market (Anglo-American) against the
rest (and in particular continental European markets). Their project had a number of
important consequences not least of which has been the development of related research
programmes on systems of corporate governance.
At the same time, we should take care not to exaggerate the separate existence of
financial markets nor should we ignore the fact that financial institutions can trade in
and across these markets almost every minute of every day. There are benefits in global
financial trading not least of which is the return to be had from arbitrage between
markets given perceived pricing anomalies. With the rise of global portfolio managers,
asset managers have taken the map of market capitalization weighted, in many cases, by
institutional risk as a ready-formula for the allocation of investors’ assets (Hebb and
Wo ´jcik, 2005). Not surprisingly, financial institutions have developed methods of risk-
management across markets designed to protect, at least, their own positions if not
integrity of the whole global trading system. In this respect, the geography of finance
is about financial centres, capital flows between those centres, and the channels and
networks that collect, organize, and manage information about those flows in relation
to projected risk and return (Clark, 2005).
Any study of inter-market arbitrage must be sensitive to the co-existence of local
opportunities with global opportunities for profit. All things being equal, including
industry structure and economic growth potential, the larger the economy, the larger
the volume of domestic assets to be invested.
3 All things being equal, including property
rights and market transparency, domestic assets are more likely to be invested locally
than globally. In part, this is because it is more cost-effective to collect and assess
domestic market information than it is to reach-out to the ends of the world and rely
upon third-party providers of distant market information (Currah and Wrigley, 2004).
3 Of course, this is hardly an accurate characterization of the global flows of financial assets. Funded
pensions (defined benefit and defined contribution) in many Anglo-American countries has meant that
there are significant differences in the volume of assets and the institutions of investment even amongst
OECD countries, let alone the rest of the world.
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tion processing systems that rely on the cost, quality and quantity of information for
efficient decision-making.
This suggests two crucial observations relevant to the paper. In the first instance,
if we assume a large proportion of assets stays local then the institutional structure of
markets need not converge. If we assume, by reason of geography and history,
that there are systematic differences between markets in terms of their institutional
structures and legal traditions, co-existence rather than convergence is a plausible
scenario. In other words, the rules regulating corporate governance could remain
much as they were over past decades as long as these rules were not seen to be
impediments to long-run economic growth and, at the limit, a price on the ‘loyalty’
of domestic investors to local capital markets. In the second instance, however, a settled
map of corporate governance and financial market performance may not benefit
all investors in their home location. Some firms may be tempted to list on other
markets in the hope of obtaining a lower cost of capital and the interest of minority
shareholders who share neither the expectations of domestic investors nor the
assumption of a settled landscape of firm-specific growth opportunities in the global
marketplace.
This introduces the prospect of internal differentiation within markets in that some
firms may adopt higher standards of reporting consistent with their strategy of cross-
listing in other markets. This is unlikely to benefit investors in their domestic markets,
recognizing that local expectations are formed around existing channels of public
information, market gossip and history of the firm. However, investors from other
markets may be less aware of the codes of practice (formal and informal) governing
the transmission of information in the ‘home’ market of the firm and they may rely, as
they have always relied, upon the rules and regulations governing the transmission of
market-sensitive information in their own market. This assumes, of course, that neither
cross-listing firms nor their agents seek to exploit such differences in the nature and
efficiency (for outsiders) of the channels of information between markets. In summary,
the cross-listing by firms in different markets carries with it the possibility of significant
geographical information asymmetries notwithstanding the confident expectations in
markets normally thought better regulated and more transparent than the home mar-
kets of the firms that come to cross-list.
In a settled landscape characterized by the co-existence rather than convergence of
market-specific rules of disclosure, market agents may become skilled at valuing the
available information for cross-listed firms. Repeated trades allow analysts to measure
the costs and benefits of informational discrepancies and test the integrity of related
rules and regulations. They may also become skilled at adjusting to market volatility,
using their own resources and that of market intermediaries to bridge the space-time
lags in information diffusion. Institutional risk can be assessed and priced. But there
may be events that fall outside of customary practice, just as there may be events so
significant that trading on dispersed knowledge runs the risk of large losses. In these
circumstances, customary practice may either fail (directly) or be circumvented
(indirectly) by shifting back to the ‘origin’ of market-sensitive information. In these
situations, not only is there a short-term issue of managing market trading there is
also a longer-term issue as to the manner in which customary practice (inter-market
arbitrage and trading) may or may not be re-established after coping with a crisis in
market-specific expectations.
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New York—straddling two different institutional settings and expectations regarding
the integrity of market-sensitive information. We do not mean to idealize either the
Amsterdam market or the New York market. As events have shown, at the peak of
the TMT boom many investors on both sides of the Atlantic were taken for a ride.
However, we would argue that the New York market has traditionally protected minor-
ity investors better than the Amsterdam market. The issue, empirically speaking, is how
this worked for one firm where it appears senior managers exploited the gap between
the two markets in terms of information richness and in terms of the integrity attributed
to market-sensitive information. After the denouement, we focus upon the response
of Ahold in terms of its ‘home’ policies of corporate governance. We show that
senior managers were forced to reform their disclosure policies in line with the expecta-
tions of global investors. In effect, this prompted the convergence in firm-specific stand-
ards of corporate governance between jurisdictions if not convergence between whole
countries’ standards of corporate governance.
3. Background to the Ahold story
Ahold was first listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 1948 with its initial acquisi-
tion in 1951. The successor company Ahold N.V. was founded in the 1970s, and
dominated the Dutch market with forays into the US market through the acquisition
of the Bi-Lo supermarket chain with stores in the Carolinas and Georgia. In the
1980s, Ahold expanded again acquiring another two supermarket companies in the
United States. With the first non-family chief executive appointed in 1989, Ahold broa-
dened its base by establishing a holding company and acquiring a supermarket chain in
eastern Europe.
The appointment in 1993 of Cees van der Hoeven as CEO as well as cross-listing on
the NYSE (and Zurich and Brussels) were the next steps in an aggressive global acquisi-
tion strategy. Over the second half of the 1990s and the first couple of years of the
new millennium, Ahold acquired or established a number of supermarket chains in
Asia, eastern and western Europe, South America and the United States. By 2002,
Ahold recorded sales of 72.7 billion Euros and operated worldwide with more
than 5000 stores and over 280000 employees. One hundred years or so after
Albert Heijn opened his first store in Amsterdam, Ahold had become a national cham-
pion in a global industry and a firm recognized by portfolio managers as being repres-
entative of a putative new generation of global corporations (contra Doremus et al.,
1998).
Ahold’s acquisition strategy was fuelled by the lower cost of capital sourced through
the NYSE, combining new stock offerings with the assumption of an enormous debt
load. In fact, Wrigley and Currah (2003) estimated that by the end of 2001 Ahold’s net
debt stood at  22.4 billion Euros (taking into account the capital value of leases). Its
massive debt load was noted by many industry analysts; its aggressive growth strategy,
its reliance upon joint venture partners and its spatially elongated administrative net-
works were all cause for wonder and alarm. In the 1990s world of global integration
and seemingly unlimited growth prospects, any alarm bells were ignored or, at best,
selectively registered. However, in the aftermath of the TMT bubble, events such as
9/11, and recognition of similar levels of unsustainable debt leverage in other ‘global’
industry leaders, Ahold’s stock prices fell precipitously. Revelation of problems of
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turned stock price discounting into a corporate crisis.
In this context, February 2003 was an important turning point in Ahold’s history.
Significant accounting irregularities at Foodservice (US) and at Disco (Argentina) led
to the resignation of the CEO and the CFO. Later that year, other irregularities at joint
ventures in Portugal and Scandinavia were also reported. In the aftermath of the crisis,
and in particular with the appointment of a new CEO Anders Moberg, the key words in
Ahold’s so-called ‘Road to Recovery’ were corporate restructuring, corporate govern-
ance and divestment. Thereafter, Ahold announced major divestments in South Amer-
ica and Europe followed by the announcement of planned US disinvestments. With the
announcement of other accounting irregularities, shareholders ‘voted with their feet’
discounting, yet again, Ahold stock. In response, institutional shareholders demanded
greater disclosure and transparency on governance issues, such as remuneration policy,
and the rights of shareholders (see below). But the damage was done.
According to informed Dutch observers, the governance culture at Ahold and the
Dutch legal setting had allowed the CEO (van der Hoeven) to build a global retail
company rather than focusing on maximizing shareholder value (de Jong et al.,
2005). The promise of longer-term growth was sufficient, at the time, to discount
investor claims in favour of short-term value. Furthermore, over the 1990s many
large Dutch institutions had deliberately run-down their holdings in Ahold and in
other large Dutch companies as part of their own global portfolio investment strategies
(designed to capture higher growth expectations in other markets). Even so, before the
crisis a few Dutch institutional shareholders (pension funds) with still sizeable stakes in
Ahold were uneasy about the governance of the company with pointed interventions at
the 2001 AGM (15 May). Criticism was made about the lack of transparency of man-
agers’ compensation plans (options schemes) and the apparent breach of the ‘one share-
one vote-one dividend policy’. Most shareholders, however, did not support these inter-
ventions. At the time, Ahold was widely admired as a Dutch company that had become
a global champion just as its CEO was lauded for his corporate leadership and vision in
corporate governance.
4. Data and methodology
Having introduced both the issue of stock market differentiation and the crisis at
Ahold, we now turn to modelling these effects. Two types of data are used in the
paper: stock market data and corporate governance data. The former involved the
daily closing price of Ahold’s ordinary shares listed at Euronext Amsterdam over the
period of 1 January 1973 to 22 March 2004 as well as the daily closing price of Ahold’s
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) listed at the NYSE between 31 December 1993
and 22 March 2004. The start dates represent the first dates for which data were avail-
able and the end date represents the point of data collection after Ahold’s new man-
agement instituted their recovery plan. In order to compare the performance of Ahold’s
shares against a benchmark, we used data on the daily closing values of the Euronext
Amsterdam stock exchange (AEX) index for the same time period. The AEX index is
based on a weighted average of the prices of the 25 largest Dutch companies in terms of
market capitalization and is meant to represent the overall trend of the Euronext
Amsterdam stock exchange.
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(hereafter Deminor) a corporate governance rating-agency headquartered in Brussels,
with offices in major European cities (recently acquired by ISS). The objective of
Deminor ratings is to provide information to investors about a company’s corporate
governance standards and practices. While selected Deminor ratings are available in the
public domain through published reports and the website, the most useful data are only
available on a subscription basis. The main users of Deminor ratings are institutional
investors, both European and non-European, who use the ratings to inform their
investment decisions. Deminor’s customers are typically institutions such as large
Dutch pension funds that invest assets on behalf of pension fund beneficiaries and
participants.
Deminor distinguishes between four building blocks of corporate governance,
referred to as categories (Appendix 1). The first category ‘shareholders’ rights and
duties’ captures the extent to which shareholders, including minority shareholders,
can have an impact on actions undertaken by the company. The second category
‘take-over defences’ assesses the barriers (if any) against potential hostile take-overs
that shelter corporate management from the threat of replacement. ‘Disclosure’ meas-
ures the availability and quality of information on corporate governance. Within the
fourth category ‘board structure and functioning’, Deminor evaluates the diversity and
experience of board members as well as their remuneration. Each category consists of
subcategories, also summarized in the appendix. Deminor analysts use only publicly
available information with the main sources being corporate websites, stock exchange
announcements and press articles. This is a deliberate choice, reflecting a commitment
to the use of available market information as opposed to ‘insider’ information. As such
Deminor seeks to reflect existing (albeit non-systematic) information rather than to
discover new market information.
Deminor rates all companies that are constituents of the FTSE Eurotop index—the
largest 300 European companies according to market capitalization.
4 In some cases,
Deminor was not able to obtain sufficient information to rate a company; mergers and
acquisitions can be significant impediments to a coherent company rating. The ratings
for 2000, 2003 and 2004 covered 259, 283 and 296 companies, respectively. In the next
section, we report the results of quantitative analysis of Ahold’s stock price identifying
distinctive periods in the time-series. Section 6 extends the quantitative analysis by
investigating the relationship between Ahold’s prices in Amsterdam and New York.
Section 7 focuses on corporate governance at Ahold in relation to industry, country
and European benchmarks—making the link between stock price volatility, inter-
market arbitrage and management response to market sentiments.
5. Ahold stock market prices
Figure 1a presents the daily Euronext Amsterdam Ahold stock prices between
1 January 1973 and 22 March 2004. On first inspection, we can observe a period of
rather stable prices until 1982, steady growth in stock prices between 1982 and 1995,
4 Strictly speaking, to be eligible a company must either have a free float of at least 15% or have a free float
above 5% and market capitalization greater than US $5 billion (US $2.5 billion if it is incorporated in an
emerging market country). For details of this and other European FTSE indices see FTSE (2004).
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price growth in the second half of the 1990s became increasingly volatile with a period
of sustained stock price discounting towards the end of the period and a disastrous
single-day drop of 63% on 24 February 2003.
We used a wavelet analysis to quantify the path of Ahold stock prices. The wavelet
method originates from geophysics (Foufoula-Georgiou and Kumar, 1995) where it is
used to analyse the time-series of climate data, including the cycles of El Nino (Wang
and Wang, 1996). The method involves a transformation of a one-dimensional time-
series into a two-dimensional frequency-time image. For each point in time over the
series we estimate the extent to which the time-series around the point resembles a
theoretical wavelet function with a given period (frequency). Wavelet analysis has
been of interest in finance for two reasons: (i) if there is a statistically significant sim-
ilarity between a financial time-series and a wavelet function, it implies that the data are
not totally random; and (ii) being able to estimate the degree of randomness over time
as well as the period (frequency) of the underlying wavelet function, we can divide the
time-series into subperiods representing different regimes or episodes (along the lines
suggested by Mankiw et al., 1991).
Figure 1b presents the results of the wavelet analysis of Ahold Amsterdam stock
prices. We used a derivative of the Gaussian function as our wavelet function although
the results would be similar if we used other specifications (see for details Torrence and
Compo, 1998). The shaded area on the graph represents the period of time for which
the Ahold time-series was correlated with the wavelet function at the level of signific-
ance of at least 5%. If we zoom in on the edges of this area of significance, we can
establish that it starts approximately on 25 February 1997 and finishes on 21 February
2003, the last trading day before the crash on 24 February 2003. Within this 6 year












































b) Significance Spectrum (>95%)
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Time (date)
1/1/1973 1/1/1980 1/1/1988 1/1/1996 1/1/2004
Time (date)
Figure 1. (a and b) The historical stock market price of Ahold as listed in Amsterdam and its
wavelet significance spectrum. Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by CSFB,
London.
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statistically significant traces of non-randomness.
Let us take the analysis further by investigating the volatility of Ahold prices within
and between the identified three periods of its stock market history (we call these
periods I, II and III). Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the absolute daily
changes of Ahold stock price compared with the values of the Amsterdam Euronext
stock market AEX index. Since data for the AEX index were only available from
13 October 1992, the results are not quite comparable before this period and so a fourth
period from 1992 to 1997 was introduced for Ahold data (referred to as I0).
The first observation to be made is that the average daily absolute change was sig-
nificantly higher for Ahold than for the AEX index throughout the whole period of
analysis. This is not surprising, given that the index amalgamates changes in the stock
prices of 25 different stocks. Second, the volatility of both the AEX index and Ahold
prices grew over time between 1992 and 2003. In fact, the average absolute daily change
in Ahold price in periods II and III was significantly higher than in the whole period of
analysis I–III. Similarly, for the AEX index the average absolute daily change was
significantly lower in period I0 and significantly higher in periods II and III than in

















N 8145 6300 1140 1564 281
Mean 124 104 86 170 304
Median 73 57 65 121 218
SD 173 139 81 171 476
Kurtosis 213.2 11.7 5.3 7.8 92.9
Skewness 8.0 2.5 1.9 2.2 8.1
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0











N 2902 1108 1519 275
Mean 99 57 125 131
Median 70 47 94 93
SD 103 46 116 131
Kurtosis 9 2 4 9
Skewness 2 1 2 2
Minimum 0 0 0 1
Maximum 998 254 774 998
Note: The Ahold means for periods II and III are signiﬁcantly different at 1% level from the Ahold mean for I–III; the AEX
means for periods I, II and III are signiﬁcantly different at 1% level from the AEX mean for I–III; the Ahold means for
periods I, II and III are signiﬁcantly different at 1% level from the AEX means for periods I, II and III, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by CSFB, London.
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strikingly different between Ahold and the AEX index. For the AEX, the mean and
median daily absolute changes approximately doubled from period I0 to period II, with
no further significant growth in period III. In contrast, for Ahold the growth in volat-
ility (with respect to daily price changes) continued in period III. When we relate the
average (median) absolute daily change in Ahold price to the average (median) absolute
daily change in AEX, the resulting ratio grew from  1.4 before February 2003 to 2.3
afterwards.
5
6. Ahold stock market prices—Amsterdam vs. New York
In this section, we model the relationship between Ahold stock market prices on Euro-
next Amsterdam and on the NYSE, using the Granger (1969) causality test. In general,
the test measures the significance of past values of variable X in explaining variable Y,
taking into account the effect of past values of variable Y itself. Usually causal relations
are tested both ways, from X to Y and from Y to X. Specifically, we estimated the
following two regressions:
AMS t ðÞ¼ c1 þ alpha · AMS t   1 ðÞ þ beta · NYSE t   1 ðÞ þ u1 t ðÞ ,
NYSE t ðÞ¼c2 þ gamma · NYSE t   1 ðÞ þ delta · AMS t ðÞþu2 t ðÞ ,
where AMS(t) [AMS(t   1)] are the daily closing price on day t (day t   1) for Ahold
shares listed on Euronext Amsterdam; NYSE(t) [NYSE(t   1)] are the daily closing
price on day t (day t   1) for Ahold ADRs listed on the NYSE; c1 and c2 are constants;
alpha, beta, gamma and delta are regression coefficients; and u1 and u2 are residual
terms. In our analysis, NYSE(t) was regressed on AMS(t) instead of AMS(t   1), since
the time difference between New York and Amsterdam is so significant that the NYSE
closes 4 or 5 h after the close of trading in Amsterdam.
6 Causal relations in the Granger
sense are inferred through statistical significance of coefficients beta and gamma. In
other words, we estimate the equations to determine whether NYSE(t   1) [AMS(t)]
provides any significant information about AMS(t) [NYSE(t)] in the presence of
AMS(t   1) [NYSE(t   1)].
The test was conducted for four periods of time. The first period covers the whole
time-series for which data on the NYSE prices are available from the end of 1993 to
22 March 2004. The division of this period into three subperiods is based on the earlier
findings establishing 25 February 1997 and 21 February 2003 as major cut-off points
in Ahold’s stock market history. The values of the coefficients and their statistical
significance are presented in Table 2. In addition, Table 2 reports the values of F-test
5 Based on closing monthly prices, in 2003 Ahold was the single most volatile stock in EuroStoxx 50, and
had the worst shareholder return of all companies included in the index. Between 1997 and 2003 Ahold
lost more market value than all but a few European companies (Fernandez and Villanueva, 2004).
6 We could model the hour or two of overlap between markets, using intra-day data (compare Hupperets
and Menkveld, 2002). While it may add insight about the intra-day sensitivity of the trading process, the
point we are making here is entirely (market) functional: in the first instance, having to do with the
relationship between the two markets, and in the second instance, having to do with the order or temporal
and spatial sequencing of daily stock price information across markets.
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as well as for each of the subperiods, AMS(t) provides highly significant information
about NYSE(t). In contrast, the contribution of NYSE(t   1) to explaining AMS(t),
though statistically significant, is much smaller in terms of magnitude between 1993 and
February 2003, and after February 2003 it disappears altogether.
Before interpretation, we should compare our results with the findings of previous
research. Investigating Italian companies traded over the 1980s on the SEAQ-
International in London, Pagano and Ro ¨ell (1991) found that the London market
used prices from Milan to set their quotes. Grammig et al. (2005) investigated 3 months
of intra-day prices of US-listed German stocks in 1999 to find Frankfurt Stock Exchan-
ge’s XETRA prices dominated NYSE prices, even though the latter explained almost
18% and 10% of total variation of XETRA SAP and DamilerChrysler prices, respect-
ively. However, there is research showing that the home stock exchange does not always
dominate price discovery. Hedvall et al. (1997) found that for Nokia the NYSE played
the dominant price-discovery role, at the same time accounting for a large proportion of
Nokia’s stock trading volume. Eun and Sabherval (2003) found for Canadian stock
listed in the United States significant price discovery takes place in the United States.
In addition, they suggest a positive relationship between the fraction of total trading
that takes place in the United States and the contribution of the US market to price
discovery.
In contrast, our results underscore the significance of Ahold’s ‘home base’ in the
stock market price formation of a cross-listed company reinforcing the results of
Halling et al. (2004) on the ‘gravitational pull’ of home markets expressed through
their notion of ‘flow-back’. In addition, it was shown that in crisis Amsterdam dom-
inated New York as traders went back to Amsterdam so as to minimize the space-time
information ‘gap’. The period when Amsterdam totally dominated New York in terms
of price discovery was the period following on from the public recognition of Ahold’s
corporate governance scandal. It was also the period when the volatility of Ahold’s
share price reached its peak.
In terms of the volume of trading, Citibank (2004) showed that Ahold trade on the
NYSE represented only several percentage of trading in Amsterdam. Notwithstanding
the relative thinness of the NYSE trading in Ahold ADRs, Broekstra et al. (2004)
reported that Ahold’s annual sales in the United States passed annual sales in The
Netherlands for the first time in 1996. The consolidated financial statements of
Ahold reveal that between 1999 and 2003 the share of the US market in company
Table 2. Granger test results
F-test statistic
Period Alpha P-value Beta P-value Gamma P-value Delta P-value AMS NYSE
12/31/93–03/22/04 I0–III 0.91 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.75 0.00 14.2 3826.0
12/31/93–02/24/97 I0 0.95 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.71 0.00 0.35 0.00 5.0 279.9
02/25/97–02/21/03II 0.75 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.02 0.00 22.4 6321.5
02/22/03–03/22/04III 1.02 0.00  0.05 0.30 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.00 1.1 200.8
Note:  I0 means that this period of time corresponds approximately with period I0 in Table 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CSFB data.
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25% (Ahold, 2004). In the light of the high and growing level of ‘Americanization’ of
Ahold’s sales operations, it is striking to see the negligible role of the NYSE in price
discovery and its disappearance at the moment of crisis.
7. Corporate governance at Ahold
Using proprietary data provided by Deminor, we also analysed Ahold’s corporate gov-
ernance compared with other European retail companies. Table 3 represents Ahold’s
corporate governance ratings, broken down into four building blocks: shareholders’
rights and duties, take-over defences, disclosure, and board structure and functioning
(for details see the Appendix section). Ahold’s scores are set against the median scores
of Dutch, continental European retail companies, all continental European and all
European companies. Each of the first three groups is a relevant subset of the universe
of European companies rated by Deminor, while the last group represents all compan-
ies included in Deminor ratings. The table presents the state and structure of corporate
governance in 2004, 2003 and 2000.
The results of Table 3 show Ahold’s corporate governance in 2000 and 2003 in an
unfavourable light. Ahold’s scores were below Dutch standards, despite the fact that
the latter were low compared with the European benchmark and at best mediocre
compared with a continental European benchmark. In addition, Ahold’s scores were
low in comparison with continental European retail companies. The overall corporate
governance rating of Ahold did improve between 2000 and 2003. However, progress
was considerably below the typical improvement experienced in European and particu-
larly Dutch companies. After the scandal, between 2003 and 2004, measures of corpor-
ate governance at Ahold improved dramatically. Within 1 year, the rating for board










2004 Ahold 1 21.3 4.3 1.0 8.2 7.8
Dutch 21 22.6 5.5 3.8 8.1 6.6
Continental retail 7 21.0 6.6 1.0 6.5 6.7
All Continental 209 19.9 6.5 1.0 6.7 5.2
All European 296 22.4 7.0 2.7 7.2 5.8
2003 Ahold 1 15.0 3.7 1.0 6.4 3.9
Dutch 19 17.6 5.2 1.0 6.7 5.0
Continental retail 7 17.2 6.1 0.0 6.4 5.1
All Continental 194 18.3 6.2 1.0 6.3 4.6
All European 283 21.1 6.5 2.0 6.9 5.6
2000 Ahold 1 12.7 3.9 1.0 4.7 3.1
Dutch 21 12.8 3.9 0.0 4.7 3.4
Continental retail 7 13.2 5.8 0.0 3.8 3.4
All Continental 179 14.9 6.2 1.0 4.0 3.3
All European 259 17.9 6.6 2.0 4.7 3.9
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data provided by Deminor.
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As a result, in 2004 both of these ratings for Ahold were higher than the median ratings
for Dutch or European companies. The ratings for shareholders’ rights and duties and
for take-over defences are still relatively low, but the overall corporate governance
rating of Ahold was now above the median figure for continental retail companies.
In light of Ahold’s poor corporate governance score sheet in 2000 and 2003, it is
perhaps not surprising that there was a corporate governance scandal at the company.
While we would hesitate to suggest that corporate scandals can be predicted using past
corporate governance ratings, we would nevertheless suggest that the Ahold case under-
scores the value and significance of such ratings (compare Larcker et al., 2004). As
noted above, Ahold has a relatively dispersed ownership structure. According to
Deminor, Ahold’s free float increased from 49% in 2000 to 78% in 2003, making
Ahold’s ownership the most diluted of all continental European retail companies
rated by Deminor. Diluted ownership structure does not, of course, necessarily trans-
late into problems of governance or, for that matter, opportunities for take over: there
are other issues not related to the ownership structure, but ownership dispersion at
Ahold limited the effectiveness of shareholders in disciplining management; in effect,
there was no other mechanism for governing the agency problem. Moreover, given the
inherent difficulties of organizing Ahold’s geographically dispersed shareholders and
the weakness of its board, Ahold’s management was on its own.
Consider Ahold’s poor corporate governance in conjunction with the previous results
on the growing volatility of Ahold stock market prices. Recall Clark and Wo ´jcik’s
(2003) hypothesis on the relationship between corporate governance and stock price
volatility. In our view, poor corporate governance and disclosure (in particular) implies
a high premium on the circulation of information; where information is held internally,
uncertainty among outside investors with respect to the fundamental value of a com-
pany implies relatively high stock price volatility. Empirical support for this hypo-
thesis was elicited for Germany and can also be found in research commissioned by
Institutional Shareholder Services. Covering over 5000 United States corporations,
Brown and Caylor’s (2004) study established a negative relationship between the quality
of corporate governance and stock price volatility.
7 The study showed that the aspect of
corporate governance most strongly related to volatility was board composition (lack of
independent directors, etc.). With a positive relationship between poor corporate gov-
ernance ratings and stock price volatility, once Ahold’s poor governance practices came
to light that relationship simply strengthened.
Interpreting the corporate governance scores of Ahold, we need also to consider the
significance of cross-listing between Amsterdam and New York. Ahold was the only
retail corporation included in the FTSE Eurotop 300 and rated by Deminor that had its
ADRs listed on the NYSE. The issue is whether the NYSE listing had any impact on
Ahold’s corporate governance. As noted above, traders on the NYSE followed Amster-
dam prices, particularly after the shock of February 2003. The disadvantages of an
overseas and/or foreign trading location in terms of access to quality information is
well-documented in the finance literature (e.g. Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002). In our
7 Considering the relationship between corporate governance and stock market volatility it is interesting to
mention that Fernandez and Villanueva (2004) show that between 1998 and 2003 the EuroStoxx Index
was much more volatile than Dow Jones Industrial Average or the S&P500.
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compounded by poor corporate governance. We would suggest that United States
traders having information about Ahold provided through the NYSE, but being far
from the headquarters and management of a badly governed Ahold, had little objective
reason to trust New York market information. And yet they did, seduced perhaps by
the fact that US retail sales accounted for the majority of Ahold’s revenue. It took the
on-set of the 2003 scandal to reveal the full magnitude of corporate governance prob-
lems at Ahold, contributing to the lack of trust of institutional investors in the available
public information.
There is other evidence to substantiate our claim about the relationship between the
location of stock market price information and corporate governance. Hupperets and
Menkveld (2002) analysed price discovery in mid-1990s for seven Dutch blue chips
cross-listed between the NYSE and Amsterdam. They found the contribution of New
York in relation to Amsterdam to be high for Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever, low for
KLM, Philips and Aegon, and negligible for KPN and Ahold. Strikingly, if we use 2003
Deminor data and array the above companies in descending order of their overall
corporate governance score, their order would be exactly the same. This finding sup-
ports our contention about the relationship between price discovery of cross-listed
stocks and corporate governance. The poorer a company’s corporate governance
rating, the more likely that price discovery is based solely on information originating
in the home stock market of the company.
8. Implications and conclusions
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the temporal and spatial components of
Aholds’s stock prices, taking advantage of recent developments in time-series analysis.
In doing so, we deployed a framework for analysing inter-market stock price arbitrage
using Granger tests of causality to determine the interplay between leading and lagging
global stock markets on a 24 h basis. Another contribution of the paper is the use of a
proprietary database on corporate governance ratings to measure and assess the
responsiveness of one firm to the stock market interests of global investors at home
and abroad. Most importantly, in this paper we link the substantive fields of economic
geography and finance to interrogate the performance of global stock markets
and national systems of corporate governance. We show that the economic geography
of stock market information has profound implications for the performance of
global stock markets even if the expectations imposed by institutional investors on
recalcitrant firms are such that the market for information is becoming more global
according to common expectations regarding standards of disclosure and transparency
(Hebb, 2006).
For some, globalization carries with it important positive incentive effects driving
nation–state regulatory regimes and the behaviour of larger firms towards best-practice.
In our analysis, we found that globalization without rigorous capital market scrutiny
based upon high standards of disclosure and transparency between markets can lead to
the destruction of corporate value. At a time when corporate managers sought to
expand Ahold’s global reach, institutional investors sought to discount their Ahold
holdings while expanding their global portfolios. In combination, stock-price market
information became more important than ever before. Relatively poor disclosure prac-
tices and a lack of transparency in terms of managers’ goals and objectives meant,
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ner consistent with the needs of the average shareholder whether located in Europe or in
the United States. Consistent with Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004), we showed that as
the company became embroiled in crisis over its projected revenue figures market
agents retreated to Amsterdam and the gossip networks so important, it appears,
when making judgments about the integrity or otherwise of corporate management
in conditions of uncertainty.
Our findings are also consistent with those of Stulz (1999, p. 28, 29) who noted ‘it is
not the case, however, that all effects of globalization necessarily increase the monitor-
ing of management in the short run. The reason for this is that globalization can disrupt
existing relationships within a country that led the monitoring of management or large
shareholders’. His observations were based upon analysis of the circumstances when
Japanese banks relaxed the standards used to assess domestic debt offerings in the face
of competition from foreign banks. He suggested ‘in the case of Japan, therefore, glob-
alization in the short run reduced the power of banks, but did not replace that power by
the power of the market’. See, more generally, Stulz (2005) on the limits of globaliza-
tion. The Ahold case exposed investors to a series of risks that were not well-
appreciated in Anglo-American markets and were discounted by Dutch analysts who
neither represented the interests of Anglo-American markets nor, perhaps, had the
independence of judgment necessary to be critical of popular corporate officials.
Cross-listing on the NYSE did not add to market information; quite the contrary, in
New York investors followed Amsterdam prices when circumstances began to spin out
of control.
The Ahold case reminds us that whatever the significance of globalization in terms of
corporate strategy, the nation–state remains important for setting the terms and con-
ditions of corporate governance. In the European case, where pressures have been
brought to bear to discount the power of majority investors, Becht et al. (2004,
p. 114) concluded their survey of European corporate governance and control noting
‘limiting the power of large investors can also result in greater managerial discretion
and scope for abuse’. Here, there are two options. Europe could continue along the
path of de facto inter-jurisdictional competition, using the United Kingdom and the
United States as reference points for incremental reform on the basis of country-specific
corporate governance problems. To do so, would be to hope that the lure of global
capital markets combined with the power of institutional investors will be sufficient to
prompt Europe’s largest firms to improve their governance regimes. Alternatively, a
pan-European regulatory regime could be established in favour of the interests of
national and international portfolio investors. This ‘solution’ is an issue of political
economy that would put in play national regimes of accumulation and the relationships
between competing claimants for corporate income such that ‘national models’ may be
jettisoned in favour of the Anglo-American model. This prospect is viewed with alarm
in some quarters (witness Dore, 2000).
Finally, the Ahold case could be thought as an instance of what Clark and Hebb
(2004) referred to as ‘pension fund corporate engagement’: an instance where major
institutional investors intervened directly with the firm to force-through reform in the
interests of prompting better stock market performance. It seems that domestic and EU
regulatory agencies came last to the Ahold crisis; while legal proceedings were instituted
to assess the liability of Ahold’s auditors and the like, the swiftest response to the crisis
came from those with the biggest ownership stakes in the firm. Consistent with the
318   Clark et al.interests of minority global investors, management’s ‘reforms’ sought to improve the
capacity of those investors to assess public information about current circumstances
and prospects. This is not unlike the impact that institutional investors have had on
Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever and the pressures on those companies to improve their
internal accountability and external transparency. These types of actions by institu-
tional investors are arguably consistent with their role as ‘universal owners’ (Hawley
and Williams, 2005).
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Appendix 1
Major criteria considered within the Deminor corporate governance
rating categories (based on Deminor, 2004)
Shareholders’ rights and duties
The major criterion concerns the respect of the one-share one-vote one-dividend principle, the
violation of which implies that some shareholders are privileged over others. It is also important
whether there are procedures in place to make voting easy for shareholders. Other criteria include
shareholders’ rights to propose items to be considered at the Annual General Meeting, attendance
rates at the Annual General Meetings and whether existing shareholders maintain pre-emptive
rights.
Take-over defences
This involves the presence and the strength of devices that could be used to protect the company
from a hostile take over. Some of them result from the ownership structure. A majority share-
holder for example makes a take over impossible unless it is agreed with them, irrespective of the
interests of minority shareholders. Other devices making a take over impossible or unattractive
to a hostile-bidder include management or board members making themselves impossible to
dismiss (board and management insulation) or dismissible only after a hefty payment (golden
parachutes).
Disclosure
This analyses the transparency of a corporation measured by the quantity and quality of non-
financial information on its governance structure, including the shareholder structure, the
composition and functioning of the board, availability of documents in English, accounting
Ahold’s crisis of corporate governance   321standards and environmental information. Other criteria include information on executive and
board remuneration, stock options, as well as the rotation and fees of auditors.
Board structure and functioning
The major factor refers to the composition of the board. The board should include members who
are independent from both the company management and major shareholders. Board members
should be experienced and have a diverse background, and the same person should not take the
positions of the chairman of the board and the chief executive officer. Board members should
meet frequently and their work should be well organized. Other criteria consider the election and
the remuneration of the board.
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